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1

Introduction

Since the 1970s, the nonproÖt sector has recorded a continuous growth worldwide, both in terms of
number of units as well as of received donations. The National Center for Charitable Statistics (2016)
reports for the U.S. 1,41 million of nonproÖt organizations in 2013, with a 2.8 percent increase from
2003. For 2017, Giving USA (2018) indicates donations of $410.02 billion, with a 5.2 percent increase
from 2016. In Europe, yearly philanthropic contributions were estimated at about 87.5 billion Euro
(ERNOP, 2017). Most of the received donations have been collected by large organizations. McCleary
and Barro (2008) notice that from 1941 onward, nonproÖt revenues have been collected mainly by a
restricted pool of organizations. Similarly, Atkinson et al. (2012) conÖrm that over the last decades,
50% of all donations in the UK have reached only the four largest nonproÖts of the country. Hence, it
is fair to conclude that the market for fundraising can be characterized as a tight oligopoly.
In fact, in recent years competition for funds in the market for donations has become increasingly
intense. Looking at data collected by Kiva micro-lending platform, Ly and Mason (2012) observe
how competition has substantially increased the time that is needed by nonproÖts to collect funds.
Although the detrimental e§ect of fundraising competition is well-known among those who work for
these organizations (see, for instance, Edwards and Hulme 1996, Ebrahim 2003, Murdie and Davis
2012), the few attempts to regulate and coordinate fundraising activities among nonproÖts have, so
far, encountered some di¢culties (Prakash and Gugerty 2010, Aldashev, Marini, Verdier 2014, Similon
2015).
In this paper, we argue that publicly available information about managerial compensation contracts has a crucial ináuence on fundraising competition. Executive compensation in large nonproÖts
is comparable to their peers in the for-proÖt sector. In fact, a survey conducted on 286 U.S. charities
reported a substantial increase in the bonuses paid by large nonproÖts to top executives (The Chronicle of Philanthropy, 2006).1 Since 2008, the U.S. regulation concerning the disclosure of executive
payment in nonproÖts has changed. Prior to 2008, nonproÖts were not required to separately report
incentive compensation (Balsam and Harris 2018). This has been modiÖed since then, and nonproÖts
and charities now have to disclose the details of their executive compensation policies on Form 990
Schedule J. Such disclosure requirements of detailed compensation data of top management o¢cials,
e.g. the CEO or Executive Director, are mandated to increase transparency and inform donors and
the public about a nonproÖtís pay practice. Empirical evidence documents that transparency of funds
and high bonus payments has an impact on donor behavior and proÖtability of a nonproÖt. Balsam
1
More speciÖcally, the average bonus paid to top executives increased from $69,477 in 2005 to $142,700 in 2006.
Although the Association of Fundraising Professionals - as part of its professional code of ethics - prohibits members
from tying their compensation directly to fundraising performance, these practices are nonetheless very common and
contribution-based incentive plans actually proliferate in fundraising and related Öelds.

2
https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1313

4

Kopel and Marini: Mandatory Disclosure of Managerial Contracts in Nonprofit Or

and Harris (2018) Önd that bonuses are common in nonproÖts2 , that (future) donations and grants are
negatively associated with bonus payments, but (future) proÖtability is positively related. Bonus pay is
also positively related to competition the nonproÖt faces. Likewise, Balsam and Harris (2014) show that
donors reduce their payments as a response to the disclosure of high executive compensation. Following
the recommendations of regulators and watchdog organizations, nonproÖts have started to disclose IRS
Form 990 on their corporate website. Blouin, Lee, Erickson (2018) Önd that such voluntary web disclosure is strongly correlated to donations (see also van der Heijden 2013) and the authors recommend
it to well-performing nonproÖts to document their comparative advantage with regard to competing
nonproÖts.
Clearly, the disclosed information about managerial compensation contracts is accessible not only
to current and prospective donors, but also to other charities and nonproÖts which compete for donations in the highly competitive fundraising market. Empirical evidence from the for-proÖt sector
demonstrates that a strong correlation exists between the structure of managerial pay and the characteristics of the competitive market environment of the Örm. For example, BloomÖeld (2018) uses the
introduction of enhanced requirements for public Örms to disclose more details of executive pay ñ the
Compensation Discussions and Analysis section of the proxy statement ñ to show that Örms are using
incentive pay strategically as a weapon against rival Örms. These Örms add revenue-based incentive
components to their CEO compensation package to induce more aggressive behavior in the market if
such a commitment to aggressive behavior is beneÖcial. Vrettos (2013) provides empirical evidence
for the airline industry which shows that the use of relative performance measures in an executiveís
compensation contract is associated with the type of strategic competition the Örm faces. Kedia (2006)
studies features of incentive contracts for 656 Örms over the period 1984-1991 and Önds that CEO performance incentives are associated with the type of product market competition (strategic substitutes or
strategic complements). The evidence provided in these studies is in line with the literature on ìstrategic incentive contractsî (e.g. Fershtman and Judd 1987, and Kopel and Pezzino 2018 for a survey)
which demonstrates that a Örm that competes against rivals in a quantity-setting oligopoly market can
increase its proÖt by introducing sales revenue into the managerial compensation contract. Intuitively,
the sales component induces the manager to make more aggressive quantity decision to increase the
focal Örms market share while the competing Örmsí optimal reaction is to curtail their own quantities
and market shares. If product market competition is in prices, then to induce the manager to avoid
aggressive price undercutting, the Örm puts a negative weight on the sales component, i.e. punishes its
manager for additional sales. In e§ect, Örms use managerial compensation contracts to coordinate their
behavior and to keep market prices close to the monopoly level.
2

See also Baber, Daniel, and Roberts (2002) who Önd that charities reward executives for increasing resources allocated
to the charitable objective.
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It was recently observed that "barring a few exceptions, the economics literature on nonproÖts has
placed little focus on the motivation of those who manage or work in those organizations" (Ghatak,
2020, p.323). We want to add to this observation that this literature has so far neglected the e§ects
of publicly disclosed managerial compensation contracts on the behavior and performance of nonproÖts
competing in the market for donations. Despite the evidence from the for-proÖt sector, a comparably
high intensity of competition in the nonproÖt sector, and similar remuneration policies in large nonproÖts, the (empirical and analytical) literature has focused primarily on donor behavior but has not
studied the impact of mandated disclosure of managerial contract information on rivalry behavior.
To initiate a discussion about the competitive e§ects of managerial contract information, we investigate how the mandatory disclosure of the details of nonproÖtsí executive compensation policies a§ects
the outcomes in the market for fundraising activities. In particular, we address the following research
questions. It has been shown that fundraising can be excessive (Rose-Ackerman, 1982; Aldashev, Marini
and Verdier 2014, Thornton 2006). Does mandated public disclosure of managerial contract information
enhance or diminish this trend? Can disclosure achieve fundraising coordination (Aldashev, Marini and
Verdier, 2014) since nonproÖts use the public information of managerial contracts to signal less aggressive fundraising e§orts to rival nonproÖts by inducing managers to spend more time on the projects?
The market for fundraising charities is competitive (e.g. Krasteva and Yildirim 2016). How does the
intensity of competition (e.g. measured by the similarity of nonproÖt projects) interact with the managersí compensation contracts? Do founders or charity owners (or their boards) make their managers
take a more or a less aggressive stance against rival nonproÖts? We further know from empirical and
anecdotal evidence that nonproÖts tend to cluster, i.e. choose the same or similar projects for their
activities and that these choices are excessive compared to the social optimum (Aldashev, Marini and
Verdier 2020, Heyes and Martin 2015). If compensation information is made public, can we expect more
or less clustering? If mandatory disclosure of nonproÖtís managerial contract information increases competition in the fundraising market, we might expect less clustering since nonproÖts would then try to
escape competition by specializing in niche projects.
Our main Öndings are as follows. Under intense fundraising competition and highly targeted fundraising activities, mandatory disclosure of information about CEOsí compensation contracts is beneÖcial for
nonproÖts since these contracts can be used strategically to curtail the excessive fundraising competition.
In turn, nonproÖtsí project outputs are higher and this has, taken in isolation, a positive impact on
social welfare. However, we also highlight that mandated contract disclosure is ultimately harmful in
terms of social welfare since under endogenous selection of projects, it distorts the nonproÖtsí choice of
projects, leading to a more pronounced and socially ine¢cient project clustering.3 Furthermore, under
3

Aldashev, Marini and Verdier (2020) have recently proposed alternative explanations to the observed ine¢cient
clustering of nongovernamental organizations.
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high fundraising spillovers, the interplay between intensity of fundraising competition and fundraising
technology can reverse the positive e§ect of contract disclosure on nonproÖtsí outputs. The main intuition underlying our Öndings is that when contracts are disclosed they are used strategically by nonproÖts
as a coordination device to reduce costly fundraising activities. The lower amount of fundraising e§ort
can be beneÖcial for output under very e¢cient (i.e. highly targeted) fundraising technology and closely
related projects that would otherwise cause cut-throat competition among nonproÖts. However, curtailing fundraising competition has, in turn, distortionary welfare-reducing e§ects on nonproÖtsí choice
of projects. We also demonstrate that the mechanics of the above results is rather general and to a
certain extent independent of the speciÖc linear setting that we adopt. We also illustrate the ináuence
of fundraising spillovers on nonproÖtsí performance and we brieáy discuss an extension to more than
two nonproÖts.
There are a few recent contributions that are closely related to our paper. Paskalev and Yildirim
(2017) raise the question why charities outsource fundraising despite the fact that commissions paid to
professional solicitors frequently exceed half of the solicited donations. One explanation is that strategically and observably delegating the task of fundraising to a professional solicitor changes the donorís
behavior through increasing warm-glow giving. Harris, Neely and Saxton (2019) Önd that charities with
higher transparency and with better performance to report accrue higher future contributions. While
these contributions point to a positive e§ect of disclosing private information, the economics and accounting literature on for-proÖt Örms also points out that disclosed private information can be used by
rival Örms to the disadvantage of the disclosing party. The issue of disclosure of private information under oligopolistic competition has been studied extensively in this literature, but has not been addressed
up to now in the literature of charities and nonproÖts. Heyes and Oestreich (2017) model the interplay
between an Environmental Protection Agency and an NGO and show that, as in a strategic delegation
game, a donor may prefer to donate to an NGO with very di§erent preferences from her own. In a
related paper, Aldashev, Jaimovich and Verdier (2020) study the e§ect of transparency policies on the
use of funds in nonproÖts. They show that, on the one hand, more transparency encourages nonproÖts
to devote more resources to curbing rent-seeking inside organizations, which has also a positive impact
on donors. On the other hand, because of the higher costs of monitoring, these policies can induce some
nonproÖts to abandon their missions, thus reducing their diversity, to the detriment of the donors.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. In Section 3, we start
with a benchmark scenario of no disclosure requirement where nonproÖts keep the details of their
managerial contracts secret. We then illustrate the consequences of mandated disclosure for nonproÖtsí
fundraising and output equilibrium levels. In Section 4, we introduce the endogenous choice of projects
by nonproÖts and show how mandatory contract disclosure provides an incentive towards excessive
project clustering of nonproÖts, which is detrimental for welfare. Section 5 considers the ináuence of
5
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fundraising spillovers, argues that the main mechanism identiÖed for our simple linear model also holds
in more general settings, and brieáy discusses the extension to competition between more than two
nonproÖts. Section 6 concludes.

2

Model Setup

2.1

NonproÖt Organizations

Our model is based on Aldashev et al. (2014). We start with two nonproÖts (i = 1; 2) that competite
for funds in the market for donations.4 Each nonproÖt is led by a warm-glow social entrepreneur who
aims at maximizing the output of her philanthropic project,
Qi = Qi (Fi ; % i );

(1)

where Qi : Fi $ % i ! R+ expresses the output of each organization as a function of the collected funds
Fi and the amount of time % i devoted to the project. Funds come from voluntary donations and, thus,

depend positively upon the time spent on fundraising activities. Let Di (yi ; yj ) indicate the amount of
donations raised by organization i through its fundraising e§ort yi if the rival nonproÖt j 6= i selects
e§ort yj . If there is a non-distribution constraint in place for nonproÖts, all received donations will
entirely go to the nonproÖt project and, hence5
Fi (yi ; yj ) = Di (yi ; yj ):

(2)

Moreover, if each social entrepreneur allocates entirely its total amount of time Ti either to fundraising yi or to working for the project, we have
% i (yi ) = Ti ( yi :

(3)

Without loss of generality, let Ti = 1. Furthermore, to keep the model as simple as possible, let the
output function (1) be of a simple Cobb-Douglas form. Then, from (1)-(3), we can simply write6
Qi (yi ; yj ) = Di (yi ; yj ) ) (1 ( yi ):

(4)

4

We show in Section 5 that the main results in our paper can be extended to a more general setting including n > 2
nonproÖts.
5
For simplicity, we abstract from overhead costs, although their inclusion would not change any of the results of our
paper.
6
As shown in Section 5, our results extend to a more general output function.
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2.2

Donors

The demand side of the market is as follows. Assume a continuum of atomistic donors h 2 I of unitary
mass endowed with a warm-glow utility that is increasing in a numeraire good x and in the total
donations made to the two nonproÖts. Formally,
U = U (x; d) ;

(5)

where d = (d1 ; d2 ) and the budget constraint of each donor is
x + d1 + d2 + m;
where m denotes the available income. In order to model a direct channel through which nonproÖts
by their fundraising e§orts can a§ect donorsí willingness-to-give to di§erent projects, let the utility
function in (5) be linear-quadratic and of the form (see Singh and Vives 1984 and similarly Aldashev
et al. 2014)
U (x; d) = x +

2
P

i=1

! i (yi ; yj )di (

2
P
1P
d2i ( b di dj
2 i=1
j6=i

(6)

where b 2 [0; 1) measures the substitutability between the projects of the two nonproÖts. If b = 0,

projects are independent and for increasing b, projects are increasingly similar. Each donorís willingnessto-give ! i (yi ; yj ) is a§ected by the fundraising e§orts exerted by a nonproÖt as7
! i (yi ; yj ) = w + yi :

(7)

Here w denotes a baseline willingness-to-give to nonproÖt i where we assume that 1 < w < 2 to rule
out zero donations (which occurs for w + 1) and no fundraising e§orts by nonproÖts (which occurs for
w , 2).

The Örst-order conditions for the constrained utility maximization problem of every representative
donor with regard to donations d, yields the total amount of donations directly received by every
nonproÖt i = 1; 2 as
Di (yi ; yj ) =
and its output as

Z

h2I

(di ) dh -

Qi (yi ; yj ) = Di (yi ; yj ) (1 ( yi ) - (
7

1
w(1
b
+
y
(
yj ;
i
1+b
1 ( b2
1 ( b2

1
w(1
b
+
yi (
yj ) ) (1 ( yi ):
2
1+b
1(b
1 ( b2

(8)

(9)

We write the willingness-to-give as a function of both nonproÖtsí fundraising e§orts to indicate that under the assumption of fundraising spillovers #, we have ! i (yi ; yj ) = w + yi + #yj with # 2 [0; 1]: For simplicity, in this section we
abstract from spillovers (# = 0) and relegate the discussion of its ináuence to Section 5.

7
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It can be noticed that a higher fundraising e§ort exerts a negative e§ect on the rivalís output and
that this negative e§ect increases with the intensity of competition between projects (expressed by a
higher b),

In addition, since

@Qi
b
=(
(1 ( yi ).
@yj
1 ( b2
b
@ 2 Qi
=
>0
@yi @yj
1 ( b2

for b 2 [0; 1), the nonproÖtsí fundraising e§orts are strategic complements. Hence, if a nonproÖt increases

its fundraising e§ort, there is an incentive for the rival to boost its fundraising e§ort in response in order
to avoid being surpassed in the competition for donations. This basic mechanisms is somehow at the
heart of the model results: disclosure turns out to be output-enhancing and nonproÖts use mandatory
contract disclosure as a coordination device in order to curtail the existing and harmful fundraising
competition.8

2.3

Managersí Contracts in NonproÖt Organizations

When a nonproÖt determines its fundraising activity yi (and, implictly, the time % i spent for the project),
the aim is to maximize project output Qi . However, at the noncooperative equilibrium the negative
e§ects of fundraising cannot be internalized. Mandatory disclosure of executivesí compensation contracts
provides an opportunity for the nonproÖts to use such contracts strategically. Assuming here a standard
linear contract9 , the nonproÖt compensates its manager on the basis of output Qi and collected donations
Di .10 Hence, following the strategic incentives approach for for-proÖt Örms pioneered by, e.g., Fershtman
and Judd (1987), nonproÖt manager iís compensation is equal to
Uim = Ai + Bi [9 i Qi + (1 ( 9 i )Di ];

(10)

where the Öxed wage is denoted by Ai and Bi , 0 is the weight which is put on the managerís variable

compensation component, 9 i Qi + (1 ( 9 i )Di . The incentive parameter 9 i is chosen by each nonproÖt to

maximize output while Ai and Bi are chosen to fulÖll the managerís reservation constraint Ui , U (the

reservation utility U is obtained if the manager accepts a job outside the organization). For simplicity
(but w.l.o.g.), we set U = 0. Note that if 9 i = 1, the manager is induced by the contract to maximize the
nonproÖtís output whereas for 9 i = 0 the manager maximizes donations. Consequently, the managerís
8

In case of high fundraising spillovers, mandatory contract disclosure can cause NPOs to spend too little e§ort on
fundraising which causes a reduction of output in equilibrium. See Section 5 for more details.
9
The use of linear contract is standard in the literature and in corporate practice. Linear contracts are easy to
administer and easy to understand. They avoid "gaming e§ects" and provide uniform incentives to managers.
10
The rationale for using observable and veriÖable indicators is that it may be di¢cult to base compensation schemes
on fundraising e§ort. However, it is easy to show that the model results remain the same if the contract is based on
output and fundraising e§ort.

8
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incentive for performance stems uniquely from 9 i . A manager accepts the contract if the participation
constraint is fulÖlled and selects the fundraising e§ort to maximize compensation Uim .
The timing of the game is as follows. At the Örst stage, nonproÖts 1 and 2 simultaneously and
non-cooperatively choose a value for 9 1 and 9 2 that maximizes their project outputs Q1 and Q2 . If
contract disclosure is mandated and information about compensation contracts is publicly observable,
these choices will be revealed to the rival Örm before the second stage. At the second stage, each
manager decides the level of fundraising e§ort yi (and, thus, the time spent for the project) to maximize
compensation Uim given the chosen value of 9 i . Finally, the donors provide funds in favor of the projects
proposed by the two nonproÖts and the output of each nonproÖt is produced.

3

The E§ect of Executive Contract Disclosure

The main economic e§ect of mandating disclosure of contract information can be analyzed by contrasting
two alternative scenarios. In the benchmark scenario of pre-2008, disclosure is not mandated and
contract information is kept private. We label this scenario by N (for no disclosure). In contrast, if
disclosure of managerial contracts is mandated for all Örms, contract information is publicly available
and nonproÖts use contracts strategically. In this case, each nonproÖt induces its manager to deviate
from output maximization to ináuence the behavior of the other nonproÖt organization. We label this
as case D (for disclosure by all nonproÖts).

3.1

The Benchmark of No Contract Disclosure

If contract disclosure is not mandated and nonproÖts keep contract information secret, then there is
no reason for a nonproÖt to manipulate its managerís contract in order to ináuence rival behavior (as
this manipulation is not observable by the rival). Katz (1991) argues that an unobservable incentive
contract has no strategic e§ects when residual claimant contracts are feasible, the parties are risk-neutral
and have the same disutility of e§ort, and are symmetrically informed at the time of contracting. In
case of agent moral hazard, residual claimancy solves the issue. It is easy to see that these conditions
are fulÖlled in our setting, so that unobservable manager contracts in nonproÖt competition lose their
strategic value. In the same vein, Bagwell (1995) studies how much commitment value is lost if the
Örst move of a rival is only imperfectly observed. He shows that a Örst-mover advantage is eliminated
if there is even a slight amount of uncertainty about the Örst moverís decision. Again, full and perfect
observability is key for commitment to work. The consequence for our setting is that nonproÖts will set
9 i = 1 since a distortion from output maximization is only valuable if it changes the behavior of the rival
nonproÖt. As a result, managers will just select their fundraising e§orts to maximize the nonproÖtís

9
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output therefore yielding an equilibrium e§ort for both nonproÖts equal to
yN = 1 (

w (1 ( b)
2(b

(11)

with project output
w2 (1 ( b)
Q =
:
(1 + b)(2 ( b)2
N

(12)

Note that @y N =@b > 0 and @QN =@b < 0. Hence, when the two nonproÖt projects are closer substitutes
(higher b), the equilibrium fundraising e§ort rises whereas output su§ers a reduction since time spent
on fundraising is lost for working on the project.

3.2

Mandatory Contract Disclosure

When the managersí contracts are publicly disclosed, the nonproÖts have an interest to strategically manipulate their executivesí contracts anticipating that each of the rival managers will set the fundraising
e§ort to maximize the personal payo§ Uim . This yields the following best-reply function of a manager
working for nonproÖt i = 1; 2
yi (yj ) = RiD (yj ) =

1
(1 ( b) (1 ( w) + byj
:
+
29 i
2

(13)

The best-reply (13) depends on b and on the baseline donorsí willingness to give toward the project w.
Its intercept is decreasing in 9 i and it is independent of 9 j . Solving the managersí Örst order conditions
yields the fundraising e§ort levels of nonproÖt i = 1; 2,
yi =

9 i (b + 9 j (2 ( b ( b2 )(1 ( w)) + 29 j
:
9 1 9 2 (4 ( b2 )

Plugging these expressions into nonproÖt outputs (9) and solving the Örst order conditions for (9 i ; 9 j )
yields, for every i = 1; 2,
9D
i = 1+

(1 ( b)b2 w
:
4 ( b (b + 2) ( b2 w (1 ( b)

(14)

Since the second term on the RHS of (14) is always nonnegative, it follows that 9 D
i > 1 regardless of the
values of b 2 [0; 1) and w > 0. Therefore, in equilibrium each nonproÖt o§ers its manager a contract
with a positive incentive weight on output but a negative incentive weight on donations. In other words,
managers are punished for spending time on fundraising. Note that if projects are independent (b = 0),
managers are induced to maximize output, i.e. 9 D
i = 1. Consequently, if the managersí contracts
cannot be used as a device to ináuence the behavior of the rival nonproÖt since the rival nonproÖt acts
in a di§erent market segment, there is no reason to distort a managerís incentive away from output
maximization.
10
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Given the equilibrium bonus rate (14), the fundraising e§ort and output of every nonproÖt are
obtained as,
(1 ( b) b2 w
8(1 ( b) + b3

(15)

b3 w2 (1 ( b) (4 ( 3b)
Q =Q +
:
(b + 1) (8(1 ( b) + b3 )2

(16)

yD = yN (
D

N

Since the second terms on the RHS of both (15) and (16) are nonnegative, we can easily conclude that
y DD < y N N and QDD > QN N . Thus, each nonproÖt manipulates the managerís contract strategically to
reduce fundraising activity and this results in an increase in project outputs. Each nonproÖt provides its
D
manager with a positive bonus 9 D
i for each unit of project output and a negative punishment, 1 ( 9 i =

( [(1 ( b)b2 w] = [4 ( b (b + 2) ( b2 w (1 ( b)], for each unit of collected donations.

A straightforward comparative statics shows that @y D =@b > 0, i.e. the fundraising e§ort chosen by

an executive is higher the closer the nonproÖtsí projects. For b = 0, we have y N = y D . The di§erence
y N ( y D between the fundraising e§orts increases in the ìclosenessî b of the nonproÖtsí projects until

it reaches a maximum at b . 0:816 and then decreases and converges towards zero if b gets closer to 1.

The resulting equilibrium outputs decrease for increasing proximity of the proposed projects expressed
by b. The maximum output advantage measured by QD ( QN occurs for b . 0:866, i.e. when the

projects are perceived as rather close substitutes by the donors.11

Thus, a Örst conclusion that can be drawn here is that, when disclosure of managerial contract
information is mandated, nonproÖts use observable managerial incentive contracts strategically as a
coordination device. As a result, fundraising activity is moderated and yields an increase in individual
and total project output. The advantage is particularly pronounced when projects are su¢ciently close
substitutes (b su¢ciently high, but not too high). Hence, coordination is particularly beneÖcial for
output when fundraising competition is particularly intense and fundraising activity excessively high.
Therefore, under high competition in the donation market, nonproÖts can beneÖt from the strategic use
of executivesí contracts that are mandated to be publicly revealed to rivals.12
We summarize our major Öndings in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 Absent fundraising spillovers, the mandatory disclosure of executive contracts exerts a
beneÖcial e§ect on nonproÖts by moderating their fundraising e§ort and increasing their project output
11

In Section 5, it is shown that when the fundraising spillovers are su¢ciently high, the positive e§ect of mandatory
disclosure on output can be overturned, so that QD < QN . The rationale underlying this result is that when spillovers
are high and fundraising campaigns produce an informative and "awakening" e§ect on donors, they give rise to a positive
externality for the whole donation market. The free-riding of rival Örms on the fundraising e§ort of a nonproÖt leads to
curtailed e§orts of the whole nonproÖt industry.
12
This result continues to hold under su¢ciently low fundraising spillovers; see Section 5. In contrast, when spillovers
are large, contract disclosure and the strategic use of managersí contracts can be detrimental for nonproÖtsí outputs.

11
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compared to the benchmark case where contract information is kept private. Hence, we have y D < y N
and QD > QN .
These results are illustrated graphically below. Notice that in Figure 1, contract disclosure has the
e§ect to move both nonproÖtsí upward-sloping best-replies (13) inwards (i.e. R1N to R1D and R2N to
R2D ), causing the fundraising equilibrium e§orts of both nonproÖts to decrease (compare points D and
N ). Since fundraising activities exert a negative externality on nonproÖtsí outputs and, hence, higher
outputs are represented by iso-output contours which are closer to the origin, the output reached in D
is higher for both nonproÖts than in N .
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
In the Appendix, we demonstrate that the increase in output generated by the mandated disclosure
of executivesí contracts is beneÖcial in terms of social welfare. Hence, our Öndings in this section
demonstrate that if the nonproÖts compete for funds for the same project, then mandating contract
disclosure of managerial compensation can in fact reduce fundraising competition, lead to higher output,
and in turn lead to an increase in welfare.

4

Choice of Projects

We have illustrated the e§ects of mandating contract disclosure if Örms compete for funds for similar
and given types of the project. However, nonproÖts commonly can choose the type of project they want
to pursue. We now continue our analysis from above by exploring the e§ect of contract disclosure if
the choice of project type made by every nonproÖt is endogenized. As in Aldashev, Marini and Verdier
(2020), we can simply assume that nonproÖts have to decide between two types of projects k = A; B.
These types are meant to capture the di§erentiation of nonproÖt projects along various dimensions,
either in terms of the sector of intervention (i.e. education/poverty alleviation), geographic (i.e. projects
in the same/di§erent countries or regions within a country), or in the technology used (relying more/less
on local inputs and sta§). We want to analyze if the requirement of contract disclosure induces the
nonproÖts to a more or less e¢cient choice of project types.
To make the analysis as simple as possible, let us assume that if both nonproÖts select the same type
of project, namely AA or BB, the donors perceive giving to the two nonproÖtsí projects as imperfect
substitutes and the parameter b, which captures the degree of substitutability of giving to the two
nonproÖts, takes a value b 2 (0; 1). Contrarily, if each nonproÖt selects a project of a di§erent type

(i.e. AB or BA), the donors perceive them as independent and the two nonproÖts operate as if they
12
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were each in a monopolistic donation market (with b = 0). This assumption is intentionally extreme,
but assuming intermediate levels of b when nonproÖts select di§erent project types would not alter the
substance of our analysis. In addition, let us assume that every project type k = A; B has a di§erent
baseline willingness-to-give wk , where, as assumed in the previous sections, 1 < wk < 2.
In our extended game, the sequence of decisions is as follows. At stage 1, each nonproÖt (simultaneously and non-cooperatively) chooses its type of project, A or B to maximize output. The remaining
stages are like in the previous section. At stage 2, nonproÖts design the managersí contracts strategically
under mandatory contract disclosure. At stage 3, managers determine their fundraising e§ort levels to
maximize their compensation. Finally, donors make their donations, nonproÖts collect them and the
selected projects are carried out.13

4.1

Choice of Projects Under the Benchmark of No Disclosure

Consider stage 1, in which every nonproÖt decides on the type of projects, A or B. Each nonproÖt
compares the output obtained when the two nonproÖts choose the same type of project (project clustering
AA or BB) with the output obtained when the two nonproÖts choose di§erent project types (project
specialization AB or BA). Under project clustering, the projects are perceived as imperfect substitutes
and the output is as in (12),
QN
kk =

wk2 (1 ( b)
;
(1 + b) (2 ( b)2

(17)

where k = A or B. Under project specialization in which nonproÖt 1 selects project type A and nonproÖt
2 selects project type B (or vice versa), the projects are perceived as distinct and with b = 0 we get
QN
kl =

wk2
4

(18)

where k; l = A or B and k 6= l. Note that since in the latter case the two nonproÖts are engaged

in di§erent project types, they act like monopolists on these projects. The nonproÖtsí choice of project
types at stage 1 can be represented by the following normal form game:
1/2
A
B

A

B

N
QN
AA ; QAA
N
QBA ; QN
AB

N
QN
AB ; QBA
N
QBB ; QN
BB

NonproÖtsí Choice of Pro ject Types

13

We purposely assume that the choice of project types always remains in the hands of nonproÖts and is never delegated
to managers. This is in line with what is usually observed in practice, where the decisions concerning their core mission
remain appanage of the owners.

13
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To determine the best-response of each nonproÖt, consider without loss of generality nonproÖt 1.
Suppose its rival nonproÖt 2 has chosen the project of type A. In this case, by (17)-(18), nonproÖt 1ís
choice of project type reduces to the comparison
2(1 ( b)

1

(2 ( b) (1 ( b2 ) 2
|
{z
}

wA ? wB .

X N (b)

Similarly, suppose nonproÖt 2 has chosen the project of type B. Then, nonproÖt 1 compares
2(1 ( b)

1

(2 ( b) (1 ( b2 ) 2
|
{z
}

wB ? wA :

(19)

X N (b)

Consequently, for the benchmark case of no disclosure of contract information we have the following
choices of project types in equilibrium (see also Aldashev, Marini, Verdier, 2017).
1

Proposition 2 Let X N (b) = 2(1 ( b)=((2 ( b) (1 ( b2 ) 2 ). Then, we have the following result.

(i) AA is the unique Nash equilibrium in the choice of project types if
X N (b)wA > wB

(20)

X N (b)wB > wA

(21)

(ii) BB is the unique Nash equilibrium if

(iii) AB and BA are Nash equilibria in pure strategies in the choice of project types if14
X N (b)wA + wB and

X N (b)wB + wA .

[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 illustrates the basic mechanism underlying the results of Proposition 2 where the lines
N

X (b)wA = wB and X N (b)wB = wA are denoted by (AAN ) and (BB N ) respectively. When the donorsí
willingness-to-give to the two di§erent project types, wA and wB , are extremely polarized, either in favor
of project type A or project type B, the two nonproÖts prefer to cluster their projects (either in AA or
in BB respectively). Clustering raises the level of fundraising activity, regardless of the intensity of the
competitive pressure b. In contrast, when the donorsí willingness-to-give to the two project types are
not too di§erent (which occurs in the region around the 45# line), the two nonproÖts will be inclined
to select di§erent project types in equilibrium to escape the intensity of fundraising competition, the
more so the higher is the level of b.
14

Case (iii) includes also a mixed-strategy equilibrium.

14
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4.2

Choice of Project Types under Mandatory Contract Disclosure

Our analysis on mandatory contract disclosure and the associated strategic use of managerial compensation contracts raises the question if contract disclosure provides an incentive or a disincentive for
nonproÖts to cluster in the same project type. Using a standard backward induction procedure, we
assume that when both nonproÖts decide on the type of project (k = A, B) they anticipate that they
can use their executiveís contract (10) strategically and in turn can a§ect the intensity of fundraising
activity.
Hence, under project clustering, analogously to the case of (14), the nonproÖts choose
9D
kk = 1 +

(1 ( b)b2 wk
;
4 ( b (2 ( b) ( b2 wk (1 ( b)

(22)

for k = A; B. Thus, following (15) the fundraising e§ort of every nonproÖt will be
D
=1(
ykk

2wk (1 ( b)
;
4 ( b (b + 2)

with corresponding output (see (16))
QD
kk =

2 (2 ( b2 ) (1 ( b) wk2
:
(b + 1) (4 ( b (b + 2))2

(23)

Under project specialization (AB or BA), the nonproÖts work on completely di§erent project types
and b = 0. Obviously, as each nonproÖt does not face a rival, it does not make any sense to strategically
distort a managerís incentive away from output maximization. Therefore, 9 D
kl = 1 for k; l = A; B and
k 6= l, as can be directly deduced from (22). Therefore, the fundraising e§ort exerted in equilibrium by

every nonproÖt is

D
=1(
ykl

wk
;
2

(24)

and the associated outputs are
wk2
:
(25)
4
To determine the (subgame-perfect) Nash equilibrium choice of project types of every nonproÖt,
QD
kl =

consider again nonproÖt 1. Suppose its rival has selected a type-A project. In this case, re-arranging
expressions (23)-(25), nonproÖt 1ís choice at the type selection stage reduces to the comparison
3

1

1

2 2 (2 ( b2 ) 2 (1 ( b2 ) 2
wA ? wB :
(b + 1) [4 ( b (b + 2)]
|
{z
}
X D (b)

A similar result with the roles of wA and wB swapped can be obtained for a type-B project. Our next
Proposition summarizes the equilibrium choice of project types.
15
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3

1

1

Proposition 3 DeÖne X D (b) = 2 2 (2 ( b2 ) 2 (1 ( b2 ) 2 =((b + 1) (4(b (b + 2)). Then, under mandatory

contract disclosure, we have the following results.

(i) AA is the unique Nash equilibrium choice of project types if
X D (b)wA > wB :

(26)

(ii) BB is the unique Nash equilibrium choice of project types if
X D (b)wB > wA :

(27)

(iii) AB and BA are Nash equilibrium choices of project types in pure strategies if
X D (b)wA + wB and

X D (b)wB + wA .

Note that X D (b) > X N (b) for any value of b 2 (0; 1). As a consequence, the specialization area in

the admissible region (wA ; wB ) 2 (1; 2) $ (1; 2) shrinks compared to the case of no contract disclosure,

whereas the project clustering area widens. This is depicted in Figure 3, where the dashed lines labeled
(AAD ) and (BB D ) represent the boundaries between the regions of project specialization and project

clustering under mandatory contract disclosure. The dashed lines are closer to the 45# -line than the
bold lines (AAN ) and (BB N ) obtained for the benchmark case of no disclosure, indicating that the area
of project specialization shrinks. A simple comparison of the results of Proposition 2 and 3 leads to our
next Proposition.
Proposition 4 Project clustering (AA or BB) is more likely to occur under contract disclosure (D)
than under no disclosure (N ), thus implying that project specialization (AB or BA) is less likely to
occur under contract disclosure than under no disclosure.
The proof of this Proposition follows directly from checking that X D (b)(X N (b) , 0 for any b 2 [0; 1),

with the equality holding only for b = 0.

[Insert Figure 3 about here ]

Intuitively, the Önding illustrated by Figure 3 simply reáects the ináuence of mandatory disclosure
of compensation contracts that are used strategically to alter the decisions of the rival nonproÖt on the
choice of project types. As we have shown in the previous section, the disclosure of contract relaxes
16
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the negative impact of fundraising competition. Consequently, ceteris paribus, it makes the trade-o§
between project specialization and project clustering more favorable to project clustering. In the Ögure,
this e§ect is captured as an inward move of the lines AA and BB (from the bold lines AAN and
BB N under no disclosure to the dashed lines AAD and BB D under disclosure), therefore restricting the
region of project specialization.
In the next section, we study how this distortion on the choice of projects caused by the contract
disclosure ináuences social welfare. As has already been shown in Aldashev, Marini and Verdier (2017
and 2020), in comparison to the welfare-maximizing choice of projects made by a social planner, the
choice of projects made by nonproÖts at the Nash equilibrium is, not surprisingly, suboptimal. More
precisely, it is characterized by excessive clustering if compared to the welfare-maximizing choice of
project types. This raises the question if mandated contract disclosure worsens or improves the situation.

4.3

Welfare Analysis

The notion of social welfare adopted here is the sum of donorsí and nonproÖtsí outputs:
Z
SW =
Ui dh + Q1 (y1 ; y2 ) + Q2 (y1 ; y2 ) ;
h2I

where the utility of donors is taken at their initial levels, i.e. before the fundraising e§orts of nonproÖts
have altered the donorsí willingness-to-give.15 In our analysis we have to consider three alternative
scenarios which refer to the three possible choices of project types made by the nonproÖts at stage 1:
(i) Project specialization (AB or BA); (ii) Project clustering in A (AA); or (iii) Project clustering in
B (BB).
Consider Örst case (i) of project specialization and suppose that, without loss of generality, nonproÖt
1ís project is of type A and nonproÖt 2ís project is of type B.16 The social welfare is, in this case,
'
(
1
1
2
2
AB
SW
= m + (wA ( 1)D1 (y1 ) + (wB ( 1)D2 (y2 ) ( (D1 (y1 )) ( (D2 (y2 )) +
2
2
+ [D1 (y1 )(1 ( y1 ) + D2 (y2 )(1 ( y2 )] .
where D1 , D2 are the donations collected by the two nonproÖts. Thus, using the fact that under project
specialization
D1AB (y1 ) = wA ( 1 + y1 and D2AB (y2 ) = wB ( 1 + y2 ,
we obtain the following Örst-order condition for the welfare-maximizing fundraising e§ort of, e.g., nonproÖt 1:
@SW AB
= (y1 + (1 ( y1 ) ( (wA ( 1 + y1 ) = 0:
@y1
15

It can be shown that evaluating the donorsí utility ex post (i.e. taking into account the e§ect of fundrasing on the
equilibrium willingness-to-give) would reinforce the conclusions reached here.
16
Recall that in this case b = 0, so that the interaction terms in the donorsí utility function vanish.
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The resulting socially optimal level of fundraising is
!

y1AB =

2 ( wA
:
3

Similarly, for project B operated by nonproÖt 2 we get
2 ( wB
.
3

!

y2AB =

The corresponding optimal value of social welfare under project specialization scenario (AB) (and also
(BA)) is
2
2
2 (wA
+ wB
) ( 2 (wA + wB ) + 1
:
(28)
3
It is easy to see that in the noncooperative equilibrium where nonproÖts choose their fundraising e§orts
!

SWAB = m +

to maximize their outputs, there is too much fundraising as compared to the social optimum choice of
fundraising. For example, the corresponding Örst-order condition for nonproÖt 1 at the noncooperative
!

equilibrium yields y1 = (2 ( wA ) =2 > y1AB .

Consider next the two cases (ii) and (iii) of project clustering where both nonproÖts either choose

project type A or project type B (AA or BB). Denoting y = (y1 ; y2 ), social welfare is
'
(
1
1
2
2
SWkk = m + (wk ( 1)D1 (y) + (wk ( 1)D2 (y) ( (D1 (y)) ( (D2 (y)) ( bD1 (y)D2 (y) +
2
2
+ [D1 (y)(1 ( y1 ) + D2 (y)(1 ( y2 )] .
Thus, using the fact that under project clustering
D1kk (y) =

(wk ( 1)(1 ( b) + y1 ( by2
(wk ( 1)(1 ( b) + y2 ( by1
and D2kk (y) =
,
2
1(b
1 ( b2

the optimal values of fundraising are
!

!

y1kk = y2kk =

2 ( wk
.
3

and the maximum social welfare under clustering is, therefore
!

SWkk = m +

(1 ( 2wk )2
:
3 (b + 1)

(29)
!

We can now compare the social welfare in cases (i)-(iii). Since @SWkk =@wk > 0 for 2 > wk > 1, we
have
SWAA R SWBB , wA R wB .
!

!

18
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Also, for b = 0 we have:
!

!

!

!

SWAA > SWAB , wA > wB ;
SWBB > SWAB , wB > wA .
Therefore, when competition between nonproÖts is absent and both nonproÖts operate in monopolistic
niches (b = 0), clustering is always socially e¢cient and the optimal non-clustering area reduces to the
45# -line where wB = wA . In addition, when projects are clustered, the welfare decreases with b, i.e.
@SWkk =@b = ( (1 ( 2wk )2 =3 (b + 1)2 < 0.
!

Moreover, using (28) and (29), it is straightforward to see that, in general, at the optimal fundraising

choice,
!

!

(30)

SWAA > SWBA
for
!

(31)

a(b) + X (b) wA > wB
and, similarly,
!

!

(32)

SWBB > SWAB
for
!

(33)

a(b) + X (b) wB > wA ;
where

p
p
1 ( b2
1 + b ( 1 ( b2
!
a(b) and X (b) :
2(1 + b)
1+b
!

Notice that for b = 0, the intercept a(b) becomes equal to zero and the slope X (b) = 1. Thus, for
this extreme case, clustering in AA (BB) is socially optimal for wA > wB (wB > wA ). As the intensity
!

of competition b increases, the intercept a(b) rises from 0 to 0:5, while the slope X (b) decreases from
1 to 0. Consequently, the two lines (AA) and (BB) separating the clustering and the specialization
areas under social welfare maximization rotate outwards. The area of project specialization broadens,
whereas the two zones favorable to clustering in project A or project B, shrink. Notice also that for
b , 0:8 the socially advantageous clustering area disappears completely.17

Figure 4 depicts the areas of clustering under no contract disclosure (marked by AAN and BB N ),

contract disclosure (marked by AAD and BB D ), and under social welfare maximization (marked by
17

This can be seen by solving the equation
p
p
1 ( b2
1 + b ( 1 ( b2
+
) max wA
min wB = 1 =
2(1 + b)
1+b

for b which yields b = 4=5.
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!

!

!

!

AA and BB ).The dashed-dotted lines AA and BB represent the lines separating the clustering and
specialization area in the latter case.
[Insert here Figure 4]
Most importantly, if we compare the areas of the social optimum with the choice made by the
nonproÖts at the Nash equilibrium under no contract disclosure, we can Örst observe that for any
level of b 2 (0; 1) and for all admissible values of the willingness-to-give for the two projects (i.e. for
wk 2 (1; 2)), we have

!

X N (b)wA > a(b) + X (b) wA :

Therefore, as illustrated by Figure 4, the nonproÖts have an ine¢ciently high tendency to cluster
at any level of fundraising competition, the more so the higher the intensity of competition. Even
more importantly for our analysis is the ináuence of mandatory disclosure of managerial compensation
contracts on the nonproÖtsí selection of project types. As we already know that X D (b) > X N (b) for
any value of b 2 (0; 1), it immediately follows that for all wk 2 (1; 2) and b 2 (0; 1), we have
!

a(b) + X (b) < X N (b) < X D (b).

(34)

This implies that the excessive clustering behavior is exacerbated by mandating the disclosure of managerial compensation contracts (see Proposition 4). The ine¢cient choice of project types in the form
of excessive clustering is occurring for a wider range of scenarios if the regulator mandates disclosure
of managerial contract information. The rationale of this result is that, when fundraising activities are
assigned to a manager, this relaxes the existing fundraising competition and gives a higher incentive,
ceteris paribus, toward project clustering, whenever clustering o§ers nonproÖts a larger provisions of
funds from donations in comparison to project specialization.
Our Önding is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 5 If nonproÖts choose the type of projects non-cooperatively, then in terms of social welfare mandatory disclosure of managerial compensation contracts causes a higher ine¢ciency than if
disclosure is not mandatory. Mandatory disclosure distorts the nonproÖtsí choice of project types and
induces a higher tendency towards clustering of projects.

5
5.1

Model Extensions
The Ináuence of Fundraising Spillovers

We now return to our original setting where each nonproÖt engages in a given project and these proejcts
are considered as imperfect substitutes by the donors. Let us assume now that every donorís willingness
20
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to give to each nonproÖt project i = 1; 2 is, di§erently from (7), not only a§ected by the fundraising
e§ort yi of nonproÖt i, but also by the fundraising e§ort yj exerted by the rival nonproÖt, as
! i (yi ; yj ) = w + yi + Cyj :

(35)

Here w denotes again the baseline willingness-to-give (for simplicity assumed equal for both projects)
and C 2 [0; 1] represents fundraising spillovers that capture how much a nonproÖtís fundraising activity
increases the donorsí willingness-to-give to the rival project j 6= i. A high spillover rate C indicates

that the fundraising technology is not very sophisticated and donors are only imperfectly targeted by
nonproÖt organizations through their fundraising activity. The opposite occurs for C close to 0.
Solving the constrained utility maximization problem of every representative donor yields the donation received by every nonproÖt i; j = 1; 2 with j 6= i as
Di (yi ; yj ) = (
with the associated output
Qi (yi ; yj ) = (

w ( 1 1 ( bC
C(b
+
y
+
yj );
i
1+b
1 ( b2
1 ( b2

w ( 1 1 ( bC
C(b
+
y
+
yj )(1 ( yi ):
i
1+b
1 ( b2
1 ( b2

Note that with spillovers the sign of e§ect of a rivalís fundraising activity on the output of a nonproÖt
depends on the intensity of competition in relation to the spillover rate C,
C(b
@Qi
=
(1 ( yi ):
@yj
1 ( b2
In contrast to the situation without spillovers, this ináuence can be positive if spillovers are high, i.e.
C > b. In other words, every nonproÖtís fundraising e§ort exerts a positive (negative) externality on its
rival when the level of the spillover is su¢ciently high (su¢ciently low). At the same time, since
b(C
@ 2 Qi
;
=
@yi @yj
(1 ( b) (b + 1)
and b 2 (0; 1), nonproÖtsí fundraising e§orts are strategic substitutes if C > b and are, conversely,

strategic complements if C < b. This can be explained by saying that when the fundraising spillovers
are very intense, an increase of the rivalís fundraising activity causes a reduction of the fundraising of
a nonproÖt, with the purpose to save in costly fundraising activity. When, in contrast, the fundraising
spillovers are not very intense, we are back to the previously studied situation where an increase in the
rivalís fundraising e§ort triggers a more intense e§ort in response. Below we analyze the ináuence of
spillovers on the nonproÖtsí choice of fundraising e§orts and resulting outputs under no disclosure and
under mandatory disclosure. For simplicity (but w.l.o.g.), we set the baseline willingness-to-give w = 1
for the remainder of this subsection.
21
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5.1.1

No Contract Disclosure

In this case, again, since managerial compensation contracts are kept secret, nonproÖtsí entrepreneurs
have no reason to strategically manipulate the managersí choices. The optimal bonus rates are 9 i = 1
for i = 1; 2 and the the managers are induced to exert fundraising e§ort in order to maximize the
nonproÖtsí outputs. This yields
yN =
with project outputs equal to
QN =

1 ( bC
;
2 ( b + C (1 ( 2b)

(1 + C)2 (1 ( b)(1 ( bC)
:
(1 + b)(2 ( b + C(1 ( 2b))2

Obviously, these expressions reduce to (11) and (12) respectively if C = 0 and w = 1. Note that
@y N =@C < 0 as expected. Free-riding leads to less individual e§orts as a nonproÖt beneÖts from the
fundraising e§ort of the rival nonproÖt. The impact of C on output is ambiguous, since @QN =@C < 0
only when b is su¢ciently large, whereas @QN =@C > 0 occurs otherwise.
5.1.2

Mandatory Contract Disclosure

Alternatively, when contract information is publicly disclosed, both nonproÖtsí entrepreneurs use the
executivesí contracts strategically to ináuence the choices of output. More precisely, each nonproÖt uses
the contract to induce the fundraising e§ort a Stackelberg leader would choose. The managers choose
the e§orts to maximize their payo§s. This yields the following best-reply function for each nonproÖtsí
managers i = 1; 2
yi (yj ) =

1
(b ( C)
yj :
+
29 i 2(1 ( bC)

(36)

It can be noticed that the slopes of the best-replies are determined by the di§erence between b and C.
Again, the intercept is decreasing in 9 i and independent of 9 j .
The equilibrium value of the bonus rate is obtained as
9 $i = 1 +

(1 ( b)(b ( C)2 (1 + C)
;
(2 ( b + C(1 ( 2b))(2 ( b2 ( C(2b + C(1 ( 2b2 )))

(37)

which coincides with (22) for C = 0 and w = 1. Notice that since the second term on the RHS is
always nonnegative, we have 9 $i , 1 for all values of b and C. Therefore, each nonproÖt provides its

manager with a positive incentive in terms of output and a negative incentive for donations. Given the
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equilibrium incentive rate (37), the equilibrium fundraising activities and the outputs are obtained as
yD = yN (

(1 ( b)(b ( C)2 (1 + C)
;
(2 ( b + C(1 ( 2b))B

QD = QN +

(1 ( b)(b ( C)3 (1 + C)2 (1 ( bC)(4 ( 3b + C(3 ( 4b))
;
(1 + b)(2 ( b + C(1 ( 2b))2 B 2

where B = 4 + (2 ( C)C ( b2 (1 ( 2C ( 4C 2 ) ( 2b(1 + C(3 + C)) > 0. Since the second term on the
RHS of the Örst line is nonnegative, we can conclude that y D < y N independently of b and C. Thus,

the nonproÖt strategically manipulates the compensation contract of its manager to reduce fundraising
activity and to increase its project output. A straightforward comparative statics analysis shows that, in
equilibrium, spillovers reduce the fundraising e§ort, since @y D =@C < 0. Together, these two ingredients
provide an incentive for the manager to reduce the nonproÖt fundraising e§ort (compared to the case
without contract disclosure). This raises the question if the resulting equilibrium output levels increase or
decrease with respect to the situation without contract disclosure. The answer depends on the di§erence
between the spillover rate C and the proximity of projects for donors, i.e. b. For b ( C > 0, it turns out
that QD , QN . If, in contrast, spillovers are su¢ciently high (C > b), we have QD < QN . Consequently,

when fundraising e§orts are not proprietary to projects and spillovers are large, mandatory contract
disclosure is harmful to nonproÖtsí outputs. We summarize this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 If spillovers are su¢ciently small compared to the intensity of competition, i.e. C < b,

contract disclosure is beneÖcial for nonproÖtsí outputs, i.e., QD > QN . If, conversely, spillovers are
large, i.e. C > b, then QD < QN , and contract disclosure is detrimental to nonproÖtsí outputs.
The result of this Proposition is illustrated in Figure 5. When fundraising spillovers are su¢ciently
high, i.e. for C > b, the nonproÖtsí best-replies are now negatively sloped and the fundraising e§orts
exert positive externalities (and not negative externalities as before) on the rivalís output. High spillovers
also change the shape of the iso-output contours which are now convex in the fundraising space of the
two nonproÖts. Thus, under mandatory contract disclosure, nonproÖts reduce their fundraising e§orts
as in a situation without spillovers. However, in contrast to the low-spillovers case, for high spillovers
the two nonproÖts also reduce their outputs (compare points D and N ).
[Insert here Figure 5]
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5.2

General Mechanism in a Setting with n NonproÖts

Qualitatively, under certain conditions our Önding that mandatory disclosure of managerial compensation contracts works as a coordination device for reducing fundraising e§orts carries over to a more
general setting with n nonproÖts. These conditions can be derived as follows. Denote the output of
nonproÖt i by Qi (y1 ; y2 ; :::; yn ). Donations are denoted by Di (y1 ; y2 ; :::; yn ). Now assume that the compensation contracts for the nonproÖtsí managers are based on output Qi and donations Di , so that
managers maximize their compensation
Uim = Ai + Bi [9 i Qi + (1 ( 9 i )Di ]:

(38)

All Örms are mandated to disclose the details of the contracts with their managers. From the Örst order
condition of manager i, i.e.

@Uim
@yi

= 0, we obtain
9i

@Di
@Qi
+ (1 ( 9 i )
= 0.
@yi
@yi

Hence, in equilibrium
@Qi
(1 ( 9 i ) @Di
=(
.
(39)
@yi
9i
@yi
Solving this system of n Örst order conditions would yield the chosen equilibrium fundraising e§orts
yi$ (9 1 ; 9 2 ; :::9 n ). Substituting all fundraising e§ort yi$ (9 1 ; 9 2 ; :::9 n ) into the nonproÖt iís output yields
Qi (y1$ (9); y2$ (9); :::; yn$ (9)) where 9 = (9 1 ; 9 2 ; :::9 n ). At the Örst stage, every nonproÖt i = 1; 2; :::; n then
chooses 9 i to solve
max Qi (y1$ (9); y2$ (9); :::; yn$ (9)):
2i

Using (39), this leads to the Örst order conditions
@Qi @yi$ P @Qi @yj$
(1 ( 9 i ) @Di @yi$ P @Qi @yj$
dQi
=
+
=(
+
:
d9 i
@yi @9 i j6=i @yj @9 i
9i
@yi @9 i j6=i @yj @9 i

Evaluating the RHS at 9 i = 1 (which coincides with the case where the nonproÖt induces the manager
to just maximize output), we realize that the Örst term drops out. Hence, the sign of
P @Qi @yj"
. Consequently, if we have simultaneously
9 i = 1 depends on
@yj @2 i

dQi
d2 i

evaluated at

j6=i

(i)

@yj$
@yj$
@Qi
@Qi
< 0 and
< 0, or (ii)
> 0 and
> 0;
@yj
@9 i
@yj
@9 i

then the sum in the second term above is positive. Since this would imply that the derivative at 9 i = 1
is positive, the bonus rate in equilibrium 9 i > 1. In other words, our main result carries over to a
general setting with n nonproÖts if there are positive externalities of fundraising and fundraising e§orts
24
https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1313

26

Kopel and Marini: Mandatory Disclosure of Managerial Contracts in Nonprofit Or

are strategic substitutes or if there are fundraising negative externalities and fundraising e§orts are
strategic complements. Under these conditions we always obtain that the bonus rate 9 i > 1.
In order to illustrate some of the arguments above, we consider a general linear setting with n
Örms and spillovers. In this case, following the procedure we have described in the two-nonproÖts case,
donations can be derived as (see, similarly, Aldashev et al. 2014)
Di =

P
1 + b(n ( 2) ( bC(n ( 1)
w(1
C(b
+
yi (
)
yj :
1 + b(n ( 1)
(1 ( b) (1 + b(n ( 1))
(1 ( b) (1 + b(n ( 1)) j6=i

In line with our model with two nonproÖts, output is given by Qi (y1 ; y2 ; :::; yn ) = Di (y1 ; y2 ; :::; yn ) (1 ( yi ).

We have

Consequently, it follows that

C(b
@Qi
(1 ( yi ) :
=
@yj
(1 ( b) (1 + b(n ( 1))
@Qi
=
@yj

)

> 0 if C > b
:
< 0 if C < b

Therefore, we know that fundraising e§ort yj yields positive externalities on the output of nonproÖt
i if spillovers are large (relative to the intensity of competition) and yields negative externalities otherwise. Concerning the condition under which fundraising e§orts are strategic substitutes or strategic
complements, we solve the managerís Örst order conditions (39) to obtain yj$ (!) as
yj$ = (

P 1
F (2F + G(n ( 2))
1
E
FG
+
)
(
;
2F + G(n ( 1) (2F ( G) (2F + G(n ( 1)) 9 j
(2F ( G) (2F + G(n ( 1)) l6=j 9 l

where E = (w ( 1) = (1 + b(n ( 1)), F = (1 + b(n ( 2) ( bC(n ( 1)) = (1 ( b) (1 + b(n ( 1)) and G =
(C ( b) = (1 ( b) (1 + b(n ( 1)).

It can now be checked that
@yj$
1
FG
=
:
@9 i
(2F ( G) (2F + G(n ( 1)) 9 2i

Substituting the expressions for E,F and G, into the right hand side leads to the conclusion that
@yj$
=
@9 i

)

> 0 if C > b
:
< 0 if C < b

Taken together, this provides the following insight for the general linear case with n nonproÖts and
spillovers. If spillovers are su¢ciently large compared to the intensity of competition, then fundraising
e§ort yj yields positive externalities on the output of nonproÖt i and simultaneously fundraising e§orts
are strategic substitutes. If spillovers are su¢ciently small compared to the intensity of competition,
then fundraising e§ort yj yields negative externalities on the output of nonproÖt i and simultaneously
25
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fundraising e§orts are strategic complements. Hence, if disclosure of managerial compensation contracts
is mandated, then nonproÖts set 9 i > 1 and use these contracts as a coordination device to collectively
reduce their fundraising e§orts. Our Önding for the case with two nonproÖts carries over to fundraising
competition with n nonproÖts.

6

Concluding Remarks

The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of mandatory disclosure of managerial contract
information on the behavior of nonproÖt organizations competing to raise funds for their projects.
We Önd that, although such provision is implemented to increase the transparency of the nonproÖt
sector, it also induces nonproÖts to use their managersí incentive contracts strategically in order to
relax existing fundraising competition. Under highly targeted fundraising technologies and projects
which are perceived as close substitutes this is beneÖcial to nonproÖtsí outputs. However, we also Önd
that mandatory disclosure distorts nonproÖtsí choice of project types, inducing excessive and socially
ine¢cient project clustering. We further point out that our Öndings which are obtained in a speciÖc
setting seem to be rather general and extend to any number of Örms and to the presence of fundraising
spillovers among competiting organizations.
More work needs to be done to fully understand the ináuence of managerial compensation contracts
on competition between nonproÖt organizations. The provisional Öndings presented in this paper hopefully serve as a starting point and lead to empirical studies which investigate the impact of mandatory
disclosure regulations and other targeted policies on nonproÖtsí fundraising competition and the choice
of projects. In this vain, BloomÖeldís (2018) work for the for-proÖt sector might provide ideas on the
design of such an empirical study.

7

Appendix

Mandating disclosure of compensation contracts enhances social welfare In this appendix,
we consider the case where nonproÖts compete for funds for the same project and we show that mandatory disclosure of managerial contract information has a positive e§ect on social welfare.
Social welfare is given by
SW = m + (w ( y1 ) D1 (y) + (w ( y2 )D2 (y) (

1
1
(D1 (y))2 ( (D2 (y))2 ( bD1 (y) D2 (y)
2
2

where y = (y1 ; y2 ). Using the fact that in a symmetric equilibrium with y1$ = y2$ = y $ we have
D1 (y $ ; y $ ) = D2 (y $ ; y $ ) =

w + y$ ( 1
,
1+b
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social welfare becomes
SW = m + 2Di (y $ ; y $ ) (w ( yi$ ) ( (1 + b) (Di (y $ ; y $ ))2
which simpliÖes to
SW = m +

(w + y $ ( 1) (w ( 3y $ + 1)
:
b+1

Since
w (1 ( b)
and
2(b
(1 ( b) b2 w
= yiN (
;
8(1 ( b) + b3

y1N = y2N = 1 (
yiD
we easily obtain that
SW N = m +
and
SW D = m +
The di§erence
SW D ( SW N =

w (2b ( 4 + w (5 ( 4b))
(2 ( b)2 (b + 1)

w (2 ( b2 ) (2 (b2 + 2b ( 4) + w (10 ( b (b + 8)))
:
(b + 1) (b2 + 2b ( 4)2

(b2 w (1 ( b)) (16(1 ( b) + 4w (5b ( 2) ( wb2 (b + 9) + 2b3 )
(b + 1) (b ( 2)2 (2b + b2 ( 4)2

has the same sign as
+
*
A(b; w) = 16(1 ( b) + 4w (5b ( 2) ( wb2 (b + 9) + 2b3 ;

which is easily seen to be positive for the allowed range of parameters w 2 (1; 2) and b 2 (0; 1). Con-

sequently, mandatory disclosure of managerial contract information is welfare-enhancing if nonproÖts
compete in trying to raise funds for the same project.
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Q2D
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Figure 1: The nonproﬁts’ best replies without mandated disclosure (R1 and R2) and with mandated disclosure (R’1 and R’2) of
managerial compensa=on contracts. Fundraising eﬀorts are strategic complements and yield nega=ve externali=es.
Equilibrium fundraising eﬀorts are given by the intersec=on points N and D. Red = nonproﬁt 1’s iso-output contours; Green =
nonproﬁt 2’s iso-output contours.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium choice of project types under no disclosure. Project clustering (AA or BB)
occurs for polarized values of donors’ willingness-to-give, project specializa=on (AB or BA) for
similar values.
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Figure 3: Project clustering and project specializa=on without disclosure (N) and with mandatory contract disclosure (D).
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Figure 4: Socially op=mal versus decentralized choice of project types: without contract disclosure (N) and with
mandatory contract disclosure (D), ineﬃcient project clustering occurs compared to the socially op=mal choice of
project types (superscript °). The region where project clustering is socially op=mal is smaller than under
decentralized choice of project types.
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Figure 5: Nonproﬁts’ best replies with high fundraising spillovers (σ > b). Fundraising eﬀorts are strategic
subs=tutes and yield posi=ve externalites. Red = NGO 1’s iso-output contours; Green = NGO 2’s iso-output
contours.
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